Macrofinancial responsibility of central banks: theoretical foundation and institutional dilemmas
Анотація
Introduction. Prediction that price stability as well as inflation targeting in commodity rich countries is very fragile typically based on logical relation between commodity prices fluctuations and macroeconomic instability. But in the same time, while counter-cyclical instruments appear, commodity prices shock should be taken as supply shock. Thus, inflation instability in resource rich countries should be taken as consequences of macroeconomic mismanagement.
Purpose. The purpose of the paper is to validate rejection of fatalism in negative influence of resource richness on price stability. Also it is important to show that inflation targeting regime compatible with large commodities export. In the same time it is necessary to take into account political regime as a supporting factor of adoption that regime of macroeconomic policy that is consistent with price stability.
Results. It is proved empirically that commodity abundance per se is not in conflict with price stability. We rich such conclusions basing on simple multifactor regression model that combine macroeconomic policy regime dummies (maturity of inflation targeting, sovereign wealth fund in operation, central bank independence, exchange rate regime) and structural features of the resource rich economies like commodity export, economic complexity, financial depth, democracy. On example of 68 resource rich countries it is shown that price stability parameters (mean inflation, 1999-2017 and standard deviation of it) are not in undoubtfull relation with fraction of nonmerchandise export, but they are in opposite relation with inflation targeting and sovereign wealth funds dummies. Resource endowed countries are not homogenous from political regime point of you. Such regime is important driver of macroeconomic policy choice. Advanced democracies are likely to choose inflation targeting, flexible exchange rate and central bank independence, while wealthy autarkies are likely to prefer fixed exchange rates and sovereign wealth funds. It is mean that price stability is not just vulnerable to commodity factor but is to unstable political regime under which it is hard to implement counter-cyclical regime of macroeconomic policy.
Conclusions. Commodity wealth is not precondition to price instability. But political regime is important activate that type of macroeconomic policy regime that consistent with low and stable inflation. By the structural features Ukraine is closer to democracies with mean level of economic complexity and financial depth. Due this inflation targeting regime is more appropriate meaning priority of price stability and exchange rate flexibility.
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.35774/sf2018.02.089
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West Ukrainian National University